The Ira and Armed Struggle (Political Violence) by Rogelio Alonso

Author:Rogelio Alonso
Language: eng
Format: mobi, epub
Tags: Social Sciences
Publisher: T & F Books UK
Published: 2011-12-26T17:13:46.419528+00:00

'I think there was another way'

'The hunger strikes was something that I deeply opposed from the outset. I knew they were going to end in death. I think there was another way. But sadly people were not in the position to dictate other ways.'59 Mickey McMullan's opinion, shared by other members of the IRA, prompted him to define the prison protest that resulted in the death of ten activists as an 'enormous moral blow'.60 The tragic consequences were not limited to the loss of life of the hunger strikers, as a former member recalls: 'We created another monster because a lot of new volunteers came in 1981 who were prepared to do another twenty years just because of the hunger strike.'61 This 'monster' created by republicans would be used by the leaders of an organisation that had opted for the calculated combination of violent methods and political means. This dual tactic, involving an attempt to strengthen Sinn Féin's political position while maintaining IRA violence, was the mainstay of a strategy that became known as 'the Armalite and the ballot box', after Danny Morrison summed up the movement's objectives in this historic phrase at Sinn Féin's annual conference in 1981: 'Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?'62

As republicans themselves admit, IRA leaders tried to take full advantage of the hunger strikes applying this dual strategy. Thus, as the IRA campaign was stepped up, the prisoners' hunger strike was maintained in the belief that the suffering of republicans crudely exposed the British government's intransigence and helped to rally the nationalist community around such a dramatic issue. The feelings whipped up by the hunger strikes were likely to draw in nationalist voters that might be repelled by violence, as the following activist points out: 'When Thatcher refused to compromise at all and they died and died it marked a change in the ground force of nationalists even and not just republicans. And that is something that was locked into by Adams and the rest and thought "shit we could use this, we could harness this".'63 Sinn Féin's publicity director at the time agreed that the hunger strikes provided 'intensive pressure and moral blackmail'.64

Armed struggle continued until 1994 despite this tactic being questioned within the republican movement itself. Once again, as with the hunger strikes, the influence of groupthink helps to explain the reasons for sticking with an unsuccessful tactic. But these decisions were motivated not only by psychological factors; politics also played a very important part.65 The decision of the leaders of the republican movement to continue using violence was reached on the strength of particular interests. As Brown has pointed out, groups desperately seeking internal unity are especially liable to take bad decisions.66 The IRA undoubtedly wished to wield a form of control that was based on group unity; hence the fact that they subordinated most of their decisions to this end.

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